The resolution of the surprise test paradox

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v9i1.61660

Keywords:

The surprise test paradox, The prediction paradox, The Moorean approach to the surprise test paradox, The nature of paradoxes

Abstract

We will show in this essay that the Moorean approach to the surprise test paradox is not correct and that the clever student's elimination argument hides a subtle error.

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Author Biography

Emerson Carlos Valcarenghi, Universidade Federal do Piauí, Brasi

Professor do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Piauí, UFPI.

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Published

2022-06-10

How to Cite

Valcarenghi, E. C. (2022). The resolution of the surprise test paradox. Aufklärung, 9(1), p.11–42. https://doi.org/10.18012/arf.v9i1.61660