THE ARENDTIAN NON-PLACE:

POSSIBLE DIALOGUES WITH CERTEAU, AUGÉ, AND FOUCAULT

Abstract

We seek to analyze the relationship between the subject, loneliness, and non-place in Arendt, Augé, Certeau, and Foucault. We investigate how power relations and social structures, influenced by capitalist, neoliberal, and totalitarian regimes, shape the subject and their perception of the world. We explore the Arendtian conception of the world, action, and speech as fundamental conditions for appearing in the public space and confirming a unique and distinct identity. Loneliness, as discussed by Arendt, can be thought of in relation to a non-place as exposed by Augé, not only as a loss of the world but as a space that subjectivizes experiences and leaves marks on the subject. In totalitarian regimes, loneliness is a radical experience of disconnection from the world, undermining the capacity for reflection and the relationship with others in concentration camps or in a society of massified individuals. We argue that loneliness occurs in a non-place, in the sense that the world and the sense of belonging to it are lost, as is the relationship with others and with oneself. Loneliness does not occur in a guaranteed and recognized place in the world but in a non-place, impermanent and insecure, which may play a central role in individual subjective constitution.