PODERES ADMINISTRATIVOS:

EXPLORANDO A DISCRICIONARIEDADE EM UM CONTEXTO DE JUDICIALIZAÇÃO DA POLÍTICA

Abstract

This article explores the intricate relationship between administrative powers, notably discretion, and the growing phenomenon of judicialization of politics in the Brazilian context. The objective is to analyze how the interference of the Judiciary in discretionary administrative acts can affect the prerogatives and efficiency of Public Administration in ensuring the public interest. To this end, the study outlines the concept of administrative power, distinguishing between bound and discretionary power, and examines the legal and principle-based limits that govern the exercise of discretion, such as reasonableness, proportionality, and legality control. The methodology employed is bibliographical research, focusing on scientific literature and jurisprudence that address the judicialization of public policies and their impacts. The analysis concentrates on the risks of judicial activism and the possible hypertrophy of the Judiciary (Cappelletti), which, by imposing obligations without due consideration of budgetary and technical limits, can generate institutional imbalances, compromise administrative efficiency, and, paradoxically, create inequalities in access to public services. It is concluded that the challenge lies in finding a balance between respecting the decision-making autonomy of the Administration and the unremovable function of the Judiciary as a safeguard for fundamental rights, preventing discretion from becoming arbitrariness, without, however, undermining the democratic legitimacy and management capacity of the Executive Power.