ABSTRACT: This paper turns to the concept of constitution and some to it more immediately related notions contained in R. Carnap's *Aufbau* and Husserl's works that might have had some influence there, in order to find similarities and differences between them. It hopefully will contribute to this assessment of the plausible hypothesis, recently raised in the literature, of an influence of the father of phenomenology not explicitly sufficiently credited in *Aufbau*. The argumentative strategy was to expose, firstly in a separate way, the relevant points in each strand and then to make the comparative examination. This first analysis took place by two general aspects, namely, to address, on the one hand, the very relation of constitution and what is a system of it and, given the implicated foundationalism attributed to such notion, the data which are at the base of system like this. Then I move on to examine the differences and similarities between such expositions. As result, similarities were observed in that the two of them imply a broader thesis of foundationalism; they propose, in this, to an encompassing system. In addition, they contend that the fact that there is a difference between a lower-level object and a higher-level object does not imply between them mereological composition or some necessary commonality of properties. However, there are also differences regarding the kind of relationship that the notions of constituting imply in each case. Distinctions were also found about the role of sensations in each

RESUMO. Este artigo volta-se para o conceito de constituição e algumas noções a esta mais imediatamente relacionadas, contidos no *Aufbau* de R. Carnap e em trabalhos de Husserl, que podem ter tido alguma influência ali, a fim de encontrar semelhanças e diferenças entre elas. Esperamos isto que contribua para essa avaliação da hipótese plausível, recentemente levantada na literatura, de uma influência do pai da fenomenologia não suficientemente explicitamente creditada em *Aufbau*. A estratégia argumentativa foi expor, primeiramente de maneira separada, os pontos relevantes a cada vertente e depois fazer o exame comparativo. Essa primeira análise ocorreu sob dois aspectos gerais, a saber, abordar, por um lado, a própria noção de constituição e o que é um sistema seu e, dado o fundacionalismo implicado atribuído a essa noção, os dados que estão na base de um sistema como este. Depois, passamos a examinar as diferenças e semelhanças entre tais exposições. Como resultado, foram observadas semelhanças no sentido que as duas implicam uma tese mais ampla do fundacionalismo; eles propõem, nisto, um sistema abrangente. Além disso, eles afirmam que o fato de haver uma diferença entre um objeto de nível inferior e um objeto de nível superior não implica entre eles a composição mereológica ou alguma comunalidade necessária de propriedades. No entanto, também existem diferenças quanto ao tipo de relacionamento que as noções de constituição implicam em cada caso. Também

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is motivated by the recently raised thesis in the specialized literature\(^1\) that the few explicit\(^2\) references contained in R. Carnap's *Logische Aufbau der Welt* do not live up to Husserl's effective influence on that work. The examination of such a thesis is justified, mainly, by historical events that might be indicative of a closer relationship than normally recognized between Husserl and the young Carnap\(^3\). As a further justification, it may also be pointed out that the investigation of Husserl's supposed contribution to Carnap, since *Aufbau* is considered one of the most important works in the history of analytic philosophy (PINCOCK, 2009), may be relevant for the historical study of the relations between the analytical and continental aspects (ROY, 2008).

My contribution to this question revolves around the notion of constitution. In this way, I will comparatively analyze how such an element, and other immediately related concepts, appear in *Aufbau* and in Husserl's works which might have been, from a historical point of view, a direct influence on the writing of Carnap's book. Thus, the examination undertaken here had as strategy the concise exposition of such notions, first in each author separately, to later be verified distances and similarities between the theorists in question.

CONSTRUCTION IN *AUFBAU*

In *Aufbau*, Carnap establishes two features that compose the constitution relation. Firstly, there is a logical aspect. Generally speaking, the construction relationship at stake involves primarily scientific sentences. In that sense, it must be the case one proposition is translatable to other. Nevertheless, the actual *relata* of the constitution relation are the objects (or concepts) about which these propositions are, i.e., their referent. More precisely, it is said, within a certain system of constitution, that one thing is constructed from another, logically, only if every sentences about the former are translatable, according to logical rules, to correspondent propositions about the latter. In the philosopher's words, "an object (or concept) is said to be reducible [i.e., constituted of] to one or more objects if all statements about it can be made statements about these other objects" (CARNAP, 1967 [*Aufbau*], p.6)\(^4\).

In a well-established interpretation by, e.g., Friedman (1999) and Richardson (1998), the requirement is that, in the first place, all scientific utterances can be translated into an explicit translating sentence in a "purely structural" way, which means that it is through a formalized language composed only by logical symbols. On the other hand, it is also implied here that the truth-values ("logical values", in Carnap's terms) of the translating sentences are equivalent to the translated ones, that is, that the translation is always preservative of extension\(^5\). (CARNAP, 1967 [*Aufbau*], §§31, 42,
Some remarks on R. Carnap’s concept of construction in Aufbau and E. Hessserl’s concept of constitution

43, 50).

The second feature about construction is epistemological, in the sense that it requires of a constructed thing to be known – in this sense, identified – only through the constructor. This thesis implies that there is an “epistemological order of objects [so that] one must thus start from what is epistemologically primary to everything else” (CARNAP, 1967 [Aufbau], pp. 9–14. 91–2). With this, one can define the relationship of epistemological construction with the following words: an object constitutes, from an epistemological point of view, another one only when, for the former to be known, the knowledge of the latter is also required. Thus there is a flow, alluded to by Carnap, that departs from something “epistemologically primary” to any other elements that are epistemically dependent on them and therefore all constructed by them. As might be expected, the relation of epistemological dependence and, therefore, constitution in that sense is conceived both in an immediately or mediately way. Thus, it is sufficient for an object A to be dependent on an object C that A depends on B and B depends on C.

Hitherto, as far as Aufbau is concerned, there is, in my reading, a case of foundationalism. By "foundationalism" I mean the most general thesis – that is, without specifying it as epistemological, ontological, logical, semantical, etc. – which establishes, on the one hand, an asymmetrical and transitive relation, between any two relata, of unilateral dependence (of whatever nature). Stated more clearly, in the relevant respect, a founded relatum, and everything based on it, depends on a fundamental one, but the former in turn is independent of the latter (and correspondingly of all those other that are founded by it). On the other hand, in order to avoid return to infinity and circularity, there must be elements or element classes that occupy exclusively the role of founding relata and, therefore, are independent of everything else.

Regarding the first requirement, the relation of construction, both in the logical and epistemological sense, can be considered asymmetric in nature, since the relata in question occupy only roles of founded or founder, which, among themselves, are strictly distinct and exclusive. Still about this requirement, at the logical level, the case is that such relations qualify as unilateral dependence, since the translated sentences imply the truth-value of the translators, being at stake a one-way logical determination. At the epistemological level, the same is true, since the epistemological dependence is also exclusively on one way, namely one that goes from the founder to the founded. This relationship is also transitive as shown. As regards epistemological dependence, Carnap models a system as in a univocal flow, in which any of those elements that are grounded in something already grounded are necessarily grounded by all the grounders of the latter. The same goes to logically foundation. For if every translation must preserve the truth value of what it translates, then if there is a translation of a translation, the first translated sentence is determinant of both subsequent translation pieces. Thus, it is the case that the objects of such a logical order, which are the actual bearers of the foundational relation, maintain, instantiate, correlatively to this sentential relationship, the same transitivity.

As already stated, a foundational system that takes into account the demands requested has to present the distinction between something basic and other thing based on it, in an asymmetrical relationship. Even more sensitively, as the second requirement, since the opposite would imply a return to infinity or circularity, it is necessary superlatively basic objects, which only offer foundation, but, in turn, do not require foundation on anything else. In Aufbau, the “chosen basic elements, these experiences of self-consciousness [...] I refer to them as ‘elementary experiences of consciousness’” (CARNAP, 1967 [Aufbau], p. 91–2).

Therefore, these objects are both, in a constitutional system, logically and epistemologically primary. About the former aspect, they must be self-evident, since they cannot rely on anything else to be known. In addition, every higher levels objects need epistemically something from that class. From a logical point of view, these primitive objects also are utmost determinant in the sense the all higher levels objects
must have every sentences about them translatable to statements about
autopsychological experiences. This implies, naturally, that every proposition in
the system is or can be reduced to a statement about one’s experiences.

With this, it is possible, putatively, on this single class of objects, the
construction of a system composed by various types of elements matching each level.
Thus, in what concerns the first to the second levels, from a autopsychological basis it
would be possible to construct the objects of the external world. From those, following
a unidirectional flow, by the way of expressions and actions (CARNAP, 1967 [Aufbau],
§140), heteropsychological objects are formed, i.e., the experiences of other subjects,
along with the intersubjective world (CARNAP, 1967 [Aufbau], §§ 146; 148), and with
these, finally, the objects belonging to all heritage of culture.

It is also worth noting that those experiences cannot be something like sense-
data or qualia, since, as it will be shown in detail later, they are already whole objects
constituted in consciousness, not merely discrete qualitative elements. The possibility
of thinking of ingredients of a character closer to the sensations of, e.g., Russell or
Mach may come only in a secondary and indirect way. In this sense, Carnap (1967
Aufbau, §78) develops the so-called "recollection of similarity" (Ähnlichkeitserinnerungen) relationship, often symbolized by "Es", in which there is a
comparison of a given present elementary experience with a set of non-actual ones,
resulting in similarities between them. Thus, it is necessary some elementary
experiences for sensations be extracted. For Aufbau's theory of construction, if
something is to constitute the base level of the system, it must be epistemologically
primary (and thus self-evident). Since sensations need, on the contrary, another kind of
object to be known, they simply cannot compose the base level.10

**HUSSERLIAN CONSTITUTION**

Husserl's notion of constitution roughly speaking involves the fact that
consciousness correlates with objects through acts. This is an essential feature of
consciousness, namely intentionality. For the author, "all acts in general – even those of
emotion or will – are 'objectifying', originally 'constituents' of objects" (Husserl, 1982
[Ideen I], p. 290). Thus, an act constitutes its correlative intentional object.

Moreover, in a more relevant way, the intentional character of consciousness is
stratified and hierarchical, going from the basic to the most complex levels. Thus, it is
also the case that intentional objects are constituted by other objects. “Constitute”, in
this relative sense, acquires grounding status. There are, in this sense, objects that
belong intentionally to the higher or lower level synthetic members (Gegenständen, die
zu den synthetischen Gliedern niederer oder höherer Stufe intentionell gehören), as
opposed to total object (Gesamtgegenstand) (HUSSELR, 1982 [Ideen I], p.294), which
are distributed in series of steps to ground objectualities (Reihe von Schritten, auf
fundierende Gegenständlichkeiten). (Husserl, 1952 [Ideen II], p.17).

With this, Husserl establishes that, among these elements, there is a kind of
unidirectional stream, in which a given element of lower level bases another of
relatively higher level, being, because of this univocity, false the reciprocal. It is a kind
of intentional dependence, in which for a certain object of consciousness to exist,
something else is required11. Thus, if the definition of foundationalism already evoked
is used, one can immediately see that the unilateral dependence clause is indeed already
fulfilled.

With this character of the intentional object, it is necessary, given the
asymmetrical nature of constitutional relations, assuming that the foundational system
is finite and non-circular, some constitutive entities that form the ultimate basis of the
constitutional system in question. In other words, there must be certain objects that are
made up of nothing, but which in turn constitute all objects. Husserl recognizes it, and,
for these stages of constitution, it stands fundamental/ primordial objects
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(Urgegenstände). These “fundamental objects, to which all possible objects refer by virtue of their phenomenological constitution, are the objects of the senses” (Husserl, 1952 [Ideen II], p. 17).

With this, such class of objects would be chosen as first foundation of the system of constitution. They would, in this sense, be able to constitute both the real world (Husserl, 1952 [Ideen II], p. 65), and even categorical entities – husserlinan term indicating abstract objects, essences, classes, relations, etc. (HUSSERL, 1982 [Ideen I], p. 379). In addition, real-world objects also have constituent role, since they shape things in the spiritual world – i.e., valuables, practical objects – as well as concrete cultural formations such as state, law, custom, church and the like (HUSSERL, 1982 [Ideen I] pp. 374-5).

Since it is admitted that basic elements are able to provide the basis for the whole system, either in immediate or mediate way, that is enough to diagnose the transitivity of the grounding relationship at stake. This is because if it is allowed to constitute “at a distance”, then the relationship of grounding does not end when its elements are directly grounded, being transferable to superior-order grounded things.

However, as this is a relevant caveat, one should not take “sense objects” as qualia, sense-data, etc. As a preamble to such a notion, it must be noted that, in Husserl, the term “object” (Gegenstand or Objekt) is a whole in the sense of a unitary and identical completeness. Thus an intentional object, being a meaningful unit (gemeint Einheit) or a perceptual sense (Wahrnehmungssinn) (Husserl, 1982 [Ideen I], pp. 213–217), is incompatible with the idea that, as in the interpretation of the classical empiricist tradition (e.g., Locke’s (1975, pp. 298–301)), objects of perception are reducible to sensations.

Sensations, however, do not play an irrelevant role in the constitutional system in question. In the author’s words, it happens that

 [...] consciousness first looks at its sensations, then transforms them into perceptive objects, and then consolidates an interpretation of them. [...] Sensations only become objects presented in psychological reflection: in intuitive, naïve presentations they can be components of our present experience, part of their descriptive content, but they are not their objects at all. Perceptual presentation arises as a lived complex of sensations becomes informed by a certain character of act, one of apprehension or meaning. When this happens, the perceived object appears, while the sensational complex is as little perceived as the act in which the perceived object is constituted as such. (HUSSERL, 2001a [LU], p. 214, emphasis added).

Interpreting this excerpt with the resources of Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy (Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie), isolated sensations assume the simplistic character of formless stuff (iikn) to be interpreted by forms without stuff. Therefore there is in this, so to speak, "formatting" a perceptual synthesis, in which sensations are animated by noetic senses (Husserl, 1982 [Ideen I], pp. 203–205, 238–239). It is only with such formal structuring that there can be, in our words, an “object configuration”, which in turn implies those ontological aspects of the one and identical object12. Equivalently stated, “‘sensitive data’ does not properly bear the property of intentionality; they are referred to an object only because they are intentionally ‘formed’ by apprehension” (DRUMMOND, 2007, p.98)13–14.

Thus, given the inexorable formal increment of mere sense data at the time of perceptual synthesis, there is never, as outcome of the process of constitution, mere compounds or juxtapositions of a diversity of sense data. Although materially there may be some descriptive content of sensations in the perceived thing, there is certainly after the constitution, from a formal point of view, the advent of identity sui generis.

More broadly, the concept of constitution has no mereological appeal, so that the constituent would assume the role of particles forming a higher-level complexion. The
husserlian constructed, in fact, is not limited to the mere material sum of elements, but, implied in the nexus of constitution, there is an addition of properties. Besides there is the advent of a composite object, \textit{numerically distinct} from those elements that form it or, more sensitively, their conjunction. New constituted objects have, rather, new property systems (\textit{neue Systeme von Eigenschaften}), and are thus formally irreducible to them. For Husserl, “grounded units are both grounded and new, the novelty that can be constituted with them can never be reduced to the mere sum of other realities” (Husserl, 1982 [\textit{Ideen I}], p. 375).

The interaction between the system's constitution levels can now be summarized. The interpretative line developed here is not without controversy, because it contrasts with what is admitted by the author himself, who thinks that the \textit{objects} of the senses are those that form the bottom of the system. However, as the very same author says that objects of perception \textit{can only be formed} through sensory synthesis, necessarily from sense data, then one is entitled to the view that in order to correctly interpret the foundational system at stake, there must be an earlier constitution. Therefore, sensations are actually the most fundamental elements. This, however, does not imply that the perceived object is not constitutive of all those classes of objects mentioned above. The only point to be hulled in order to maintain the coherence of the construal of Husserl's text is on its character of \textit{absolute} fundamentality.

\textbf{DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE CONCEPTIONS OF CONSTITUTION.}

Given the above, it is time to move towards the most relevant vocations of the work, namely, the examination of similarities and differences between the concepts of constitution, and other notions immediately linked there, between the two authors, in order to contribute to the question of Husserl's influence on \textit{Aufbau} content.

Firstly, and more generally, it is clearly observed that the notion of constitution present in both texts has the similarity of implying a kind of foundationalism. This is because there is, in both systems, according to the broader definition outlined, a transitive relationship of unilateral dependence. In addition, within this broader framework, for each perspective, a class of elements is assumed which is the one that represents the most basic objects, immediate or mediate founders of all the other members.

In this sense, more broadly, it is possible to say that both conceptions are implicative of a system of constitution, whose multiplicity of elements is subsumed to that foundational organization. Moreover, for both authors, their projects develop as a very comprehensive complex, so it is possible to explain a wide range of objects from more basic elements. In both cases, this being, incidentally, an interesting coincidence, one can speak, as shown, of the construction of externality, the intersubjective world and the objects of culture.\textsuperscript{15}

However, in distinction to Haddock's (2008) approach, the relationship itself and the types of \textit{relata} involved are understood in a quite different way. Husserl establishes a constitutional relationship that deals, following the intentional paradigm, with syntheses of the object of consciousness. On the other side, the author of \textit{Aufbau} has in mind a logical and an epistemological link between \textit{sentences}. Even if the explicit relation of construction occurs between objects or concepts, it is only through the statements that describe or define them that the logical and epistemological – since it is by knowing propositions that one can know, in the relevant sense, about objects – construction occurs. In Husserl there is no equivalent to this. The constitutional relationship he talks about are \textit{directly} about intentional objects, i.e., objects as subjectively directed to. It is very from formation of objects themselves – i.e., not about them \textit{in so far as} they are of a determinate feature – and in an \textit{indirect} way, since the relevant interaction between the objects is performed with propositions.

However, there is an interesting similarity between the conception of
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constitutionpursuedinbothspheres,albeitofanegativeorder.Inbothissessment,"constitution"doesnotconcernmerecomposition.Inthesamemeasure,itisnotamereologicalrelationship,inwhichtheconstituentwouldbethetoconstitutedasthe partistothewhole.Tothesamemeasure,itisnotrequiredcommonalityoftypesbetween them,sothattherecouldbefromtheconstructingthingtotheconstructedone,partial ortotal “transference” of properties. Indeed, there is, as the attribution of our version of foundationalism requires, originality between the founding and the founded. However, whilisthisistightlytoimplyanontologicaldependenceoftheformalontheformer,that isnottosaythatthereisanoecessaryinternalpertinencebetweenthem.

Anothercomparableaspectbetweenthetwotheoreticalperspectivesisrelatedto the relata that occupythe role of ultimate ground. In my reading, as shown, the husserlian system is based on sensations (or, according to Ideas I, “hiletic data”). In Aufbau, in its turn, the elementary experiences, which, as explained above, are by no means sensedata,aretheonesthatstandsfortheclassofobjectsthatarermostbasicto the system.

Most notably, there is, between the two authors, an "inversion" in the order of position that these two classes of ingredients – i.e. sensory data and elemental experiences (or something analogous) – occupy in each system of constitution. Carnap's elementary experiences, as demonstrated, are, because they are epistemologically prior, constructors of sense data. In Husserl, the opposite occurs. Sensory impressions are *sine qua non* conditions for the constitution of the object of perception itself, being a intentional principle in this sense. In short, sensations and objects of perception features their constituent-constituted link alternated between the two analyzed texts.

However, despite this dissonance, there are similarity, in the two of the perspectives, of an ontological holism for objects such as perceived things and elementary experiences (or any from constitution levels other than sensory data). These aspects are not present in the sensations, for example. In both perspectives, it is denied full-fledged object status for sense data and the like, relegating them to the condition of quasi-objects without permanent identity and wholeness. For Carnap, for example, Es is only a "quasi-analysis", generating "quasi-elements". In other words, sense data are fleeting – as they cease to exist with each punctual “look” – and changing, since they continually succeed one by another. At most, they may be more or less similar to each other, but are never the same thing. Another way that this “quasi-objetuality” is expressed is that they are not ordinary individuals, such as tables, horses, etc. They are, instead, a complexion of colors and shapes at each moment they are directed to.

Sensations, despite their extreme singularity, vary over a complete and unified object of perception that remains identical. In this sense, both authors admit in the case of perception a double form of data. On the one hand, there is the awareness that only includes the present aspects of a given act and, therefore, can only contemplate, according to a given perspective, a certain "side" of the object, as a singular sensation. These are, say, “perspectival sensations”. On the other hand, they also admit that, in perception, it is present, as its target, an identical thing – and thus not only similar ones that keep succeeding each other or a continuously changing object – which remains the same throughout the diverse singular perspectival sensations of it. In Husserl, as summarized by Williford (2013, p.503),

The profiles [i.e., perspectival sensations] existentially depend on experience in a way that physical objects do not. A physical object is given as continuing to be even if no one is looking at it. But my visual profile on the object is gone as soon as I close my eyes. And though the profile I get when I open them again a second later may be similar, it is a different token if only because of the passage of time. Profiles on objects, unlike the objects themselves, are, so to say, token-experience bound. They must be experienced to be and they are not, strictly speaking, repeatable, though, evidently, they do admit of various similarities to each other. Husserl held that these profiles on or adumbrations of an object generally
fluctuate with fluctuations in hyletic data.

Carnap establishes the same metaphysical note that distinguishes whole objects from mere sensory data in which it is apprehended:

When intuiting a house, it will be immediately and intuitively perceived as a corporal object, its unnoticed back will be taken into account, its existence after looking elsewhere will be considered, the particular well-known house will be recognized in this (CARNAP, 1967 [Aufbau], p. 138)

CONCLUSION

Given all of the above, we find elements of convergence that may be indicative that the explicit references in Carnap's book does not lived up Husserl's actual influence. However, we have not found sufficient evidence to support the more extreme interpretative assertion, which credits Husserl as the “main influence on Aufbau” (HADDOK, 2008, p.52). On the contrary, there are some striking distinctions that allow us to diagnose a certain uniqueness in each project, so that it is not plausible to understand Aufbau as a mere continuation or extension of Phenomenology. Thus, on the question of the history of the differentiation between Analytic and Continental Philosophies, these distinctions may help to discover, metaphorically speaking, where the division between the Main and the Danube began.

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**NOTAS**

1 See, e.g., Sarkar (2003) and especially Haddock (2008).
2 Husserl is cited only five times throughout the book and, in some cases, only as a reference for authors who have said something about the subject at hand. Thus, it is not recognized among Carnapian scholars as a decisive influence on the *Aufbau*. (See, e.g., Moulines (1982)).
3 The main motivation for such a hypothesis is that Carnap was very likely to have attended Husserl's seminars between 1924 and 1925, during the *Aufbau* writing period (evidence for that is found in Schuhmann (1977) and Spiegelberg (1981)) and although with less certainty that he moved to Buchenbach to interact and study with Husserl in the 1921 and 1922 courses. (See Mormann (2000))
4 Although this is not the main scope in this paper, it is interesting to note how the defense of the possibility of transposition of all scientific statements into a unified language – although later, more importantly, in *The Unity of Science* (CARNAP, 1995) is be of a physicalist nature – is present since the beginning of Carnapian thought. In the *Aufbau* the passage of russellian origin “where possible, logical constructions should be replaced by inferred entities” (RUSSELL, 1959, p.155) is relevantly representative of this.
5 Leitgeb (2009) is an author who discusses whether this criterion is not too weak. This is because a “translation” that of any true sentences that simply says $\forall xx = x$ and, of any false statements, $\neg \forall xx = x$ would meet this requirement. However, for such a reformulation, it would be necessary in advance to know the truth value of these propositions and therefore to decide empirically for their validity or falsity. The problem is that the translation in question is performed purely logically, that is, without empirical data. With this, it is advocated sufficiency of the logical criterion for a translation, not requiring anything beyond, like preservation of the “meaning”.
6 In the carnapian context, this perspective is aligned, for example, with the conception that a
“formal foundationalism” is manifest in the work in question (DUTRA, 2005; 2008). It, however, is not without controversy to Aufbau readers. Friedman (1999) and Richardson (1998), for example, consider that there is no foundationalism in this work. However, if one sticks strictly to the definition developed here, as it will be shown below, one finds no reason not to construe like this.

7 A transitive type of relations happens occurs when “if A relates to B and B relates to C, then necessarily A relates to C” (ARB & BRC → ARC).

8 It seems lawful to say, at least tentatively, that the kind of dependency at stake here (ie, whether it is epistemological, ontological, logical, etc.) is responsible for characterizing the genre of foundationalism at stake.

9 The characterization of foundationalism as an asymmetrical and transitive dependency relationship is present, with more or less constancy, in various contributions of the philosophical tradition. On this, see, e.g., Tahko (2018).

10 The contribution that was used to interpret the theoretical interaction traced between the elementary (“pure”) experiences and their subsequent abstraction in sensations by the relation of similarity, including a kind of “intermediate stage” of, in the words of the commentator, a “class of sensory fields”, can be found, e.g., in Kraft (1986).

11 One scholar who discusses, in Husserl, the ontological status of the intentional object, especially as regards its identity or not (if it is intended to be non-existent) with mundane particulars is Zahavi (1992). Here, it being a husserlian recommendation, which advocates above all for a metaphysical neutrality, this question does not concern my purposes. What is relevant here only if there is dependence on a particular thing as an intentional object and only to this extent; not whether or not an object (say real), that is intentionally directed, is itself ontologically dependent on that intentional constitution.

12 This interpretation can also be found in Drummond (1990, pp. 118–119; pp. 136–138) and Zahavi (1992, pp.113-114). Other potentially relevant information on this point is that this would be the ontological correlate of what, at a conceptual level, Husserl calls "individual meanings," which can probably be taken, or less as its superior-order class, as the same as, in the Fourth Logical Investigation, proper names or indexing demonstrative pronouns (HUSSELR, 2001b [LU], pp. 50, 51, 59). Moreover, this "individual-structure" of the simple perception in question is the same "bearer" of the diversity of possible property assignments (whether essential or not) in categorical perception.

13 Husserl, still on this, but being it something that appears preferentially in Logical Investigations, believes that the perceptual acts in question are the result, even of a fusion of subordinate perspectives views of different profiles or “adumbrations” (Abshattungen) – that in turn are sensational data – for the synthetic presentation of the unitary perceptive thing. (HUSSELR, 2001b [LU], pp.5-7, 221, 284). There is, in this sense, a synthesis of identification, which interprets those “appearances as profiles or aspects of a single particular thing” (MOONEY, 2010, p. 35). In “Thing and Space”, additionally, Husserl (1997, pp. 55-61, 131-136) details how changing perspective through object or observer movement is a relevant element in this process.

14 It is worth mentioning that this theoretical interaction between sensations and objects of perception is not permanent throughout Husserl's work. In the late works, which contemplate the notion of passive synthesis, the sensible level does not feature “raw sensations”, as in Ideas, but something already of a “pre-intentional” nature, which certainly motivate a different account of the sensory data and their place in the constitutive system under analysis. However, as explained, as my analysis scope is works that may have some actual influence on Aufbau’s writing, the focus of examination, as Haddock (2008) suggests, is reduced to the second volume of Ideas (1916).

15 Mayer (1991; 1992) is a predecessor to note – although for different reasons, given that she sticks to the notion of flow of consciousness to associate the two theories – that Aufbau's constructional project is similar to that by Husserl. It is also important to remark that that scholar, although not defining it in the same way as here, had already captured some essential aspects of foundationalism common between these systems.